Introduction
Since the 1980s, American policymakers and consulting firms have been successfully exporting to European nations and many developing countries the idea that competitive health insurance will slow down or lower health care costs. But many countries have concluded that, while competition between providers may save money, a uniform means of collecting premiums or taxes is cheaper and more equitable than having competing insurers write policies and gather the money.' Nevertheless, the European Union issued a directive in 1992 that requires all nations to introduce competition among health insurers while preserving the "social good." This paper describes the efforts by Ireland to create a level playing field for such competition, the attempts by an insurer to circumvent those efforts, and the more basic policy issues raised.
Medical expenditures are so skewed that the sickest 2% of a large pool are estimated to use 41% of the total costs, and the sickest 10% consume 72%.2 Competing insurers can make large profits much more easily by taking in fewer than their proportionate share of these very sick people, or by inducing them to disenroll, than by producing the fruits of competition for society by becoming more efficient or providing better service. Unless careful safeguards are put in place, however, competition between health insurers obeys the inverse coverage law3: the more people need insurance, the less coverage they will get and the more they will pay for what they get.
Extensive research designed to identify risk adjusters that would avoid adverse selection in competition between health insurers has failed; the "maximum explainable variance in annual acute Health, either the board has advantages that make real competition impossible for any outside company or it is fettered and cannot compete effectively (or a bit of both). The Department of Health and the government seem deeply ambivalent: they want competition, but not in any form that might threaten the national system or the Voluntary Health Insurance Board.
Policy Crisis
The regulations of the act9 were not developed until 1996. Soon afterward, however, the dominant insurer in Britain's riskrated private market, and one of Europe's largest health insurers, launched a marketing blitz for its age-graded policies. The day after the launch, 2500 people called the insurer's telephone sales center for applications, and some of the press dutifully published the company's promotion materials without critical review.'0 The British Union Provident Association's policies appeared to be designed to compete head to head with each of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board's 5 policies; while the basic policy was community rated, however, the premiums for upgrades were age graded. Because they paid cash instead of providing upgraded services, these "cash plans," according to the British Union Provident Association (hereafter "the Union"), were not insurance and therefore not covered by the Health Insurance Act.
Comparisons of the after-tax group premiums of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board's most popular plan (plan B) with the Union's competing policy indicate that the latter's premiums were 10% lower for subscribers less than 19 December 20, 1996) . In a separate action, the attomey general informed the minister that the policies "were in breech of community rating legislation."'6 The Union's strategy to define the age-rated cash plans as not insurance and thus outside the level playing field created by the Health Insurance Act had suffered a setback; however, its managing director insisted that the Union's policies were not illegal and said that he "was absolutely confident of the total legality of the organization's position."
The Voluntary Health Insurance Board's chairman said that if younger people switched to the Union's cheaper policies, premiums for those more than 50 years of age could triple in 5 years. ' That's what happened in the United States," he added, alluding to D.L.'s December 8 excerpt.14 The Times wrote that the Union "is discriminating against the elderly and forcing Americanstyle health insurance on Ireland."'7 As is often the case in Europe, American health insurance and the American health care system serve as an example of how much more costly and inequitable health care can be.
Despite the minister's announcement, nothing formally changed, but the pressure did not diminish during the Christmas season. Garret FitzGerald, the much-revered former prime minister, was moved to publish a prominent essay on December 28 stating that the Union cash plans were a "very thinly disguised" way to "evade" the community rating safeguards that would prove "disastrous" for the Voluntary Health
Insurance Board (since three quarters of its members are less than 50 years of age) and "fatal for our health service."18 Nevertheless, sales of the policies began on schedule on January 1. The Consumers' Association of Ireland and the Irish Patients' Association attacked the minister for, in effect, being the sole stockholder of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board as well as the regulator of the market, and they called for him to relinquish his role as regulator so that an independent regulator could defend community rating.'9 Thousands of consumers interested in the Union's policies were left in a no-man's-land, "a far cry from the government's idea of rejuvenating the Irish health insurance market through competition."20 Senior government officials expressed embarrassment at the minister's slow response and indecision, and the spokeswoman on health for the legislature said that the minister had handled the affair "disgracefully." Then the Sunday Business Post discovered that the Union had chosen not to submit its policies for prior review before its high-profile launch in November, 2' which suggested that the Union had decided to use a blitzkrieg strategy to blast past objections and get its policies on the market, because once in place they would be very hard to remove.
On January 9, the Irish limes published an analysis by an American expert that concluded: "If you believe in fair competition that rewards better value rather than cherrypicking, you need to stop all forms of risk rating before they begin."22 The analysis described the many direct and indirect methods of risk rating and averred that "American insurers could drive a herd of Texas long-horns through the vague phrases of the 1994 Act." This echoed the Irish saying that one can "drive a coach-and-four" through something, and later that day journalists pressed the Irish minister to answer questions about driving Texas longhorns through the act, which seemed to butt the minister off his fence. That evening he issued a strict warning that the Union could not issue "packages" that discriminated against the elderly or ill and that, if it did, it could lose its license to trade.23 (Of course, these policies had already been issued and were for sale.) A week later, the minister announced an "agreement" with the Union that it would withdraw its age-rated policies. He also established an independent review group to investigate loopholes or flaws in the community-rated structure of the market (press release, January 17, 1997). The campaign to stop the invasion of risk-rated policies and destroy community rating had succeeded, a rare event in health policy.
Policy Implications
The Irish people and their elected officials have shown moral and policy leadership in attempting to establish rules so that competition in health insurance rewards greater efficiency rather than discrimination against older and sicker citizens. But the law and regulations still leave room for community-rated competitors to discriminate. Beyond that, the entire communityrated system, and the social justice it embodies, will soon collapse unless strategic adjustments are made that reward the young for signing up The rising premiums of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board, for example, are not due to its being inefficient, and competition will raise its overhead costs. Rather, the board's cost problems stem from its being piggy-backed on the organization, culture, financing, and structure of the public system run by the Department of Health, and both are strongly centered on hospital-based, specialized services. For example, the department added considerably more consultants (senior subspecialists) to the system and increased hospital charges, forcing the board's costs to rise faster than would have been the case otherwise.8 Thus, the board was in a no-win position between the resulting cost spiral and the need to minimiize premium increases to keep down political unrest among its subscribers. As a result, the board's operating losses have exceeded projections for several years, depleting an earlier reserve fund and causing the board to come precariously close to not meeting its solvency requirements in what has been characterized as a "financial meltdown."29 Yet, keeping premiums below the costs of medical services won no friends among subscribers. Moreover, as supplementary upgrades that pay significantly more to doctors, the board's policies exacerbate cost increases with strong incentives for doctors to hospitalize patients more frequently and to do more tests and procedures. It is a kind of "wallet biopsy" in reverse, in which providers check to see whether patients have a private insurance card and then increase tests, procedures, and fees if they do. In short, substantial solutions to the Voluntary Health Insurance Board's underlying problems of rising costs and overuse of hospitalbased services will require its worldng with the Department of Health to develop a costeffective restructuring of the entire Irish health care system. D
